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As this century ends, old-age pensionsystems worldwide are experiencing
tremendous strain and undergoing rigorous examination. At issue is the
ability of current schemes to survive demographicchanges which threaten
to bankrupt most OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) members' old age pension systems by the early part of the
twenty-first century (Peterson, 1996; Steuerle & Bakija, 1994; World
Bank, 1994). A variety of proposals have been advanced in response to
this concern, which reflect different underlying values and priorities.
Varying significantlyin their recommendationsfor the appropriatebalance
between public and private efforts, these proposals form a continuum of
policy choices rangingfrom the ameliorative model (firstadvocated by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to the fully
privatized model (recommended by the Cato Institute). Between these two
extremes, the World Bank and others recommend diversification of the
public-only format by relying more heavily on other retirement-income
sources. These three alternatives to pension reform-the ameliorative,
mixed and privatized models-have economic and social implications. The
emerging field of socio-economic theory merges dimensions of economics
andsocial science to createa broaderperspectivethat accountsfor both costbenefit analysis and humanistic considerations.Applying this approach,
six socio-economic criteria have been identified to conduct a systematic
comparisonandassessment of the ameliorative,mixed and privatizedpaths
to Social Security reform.

As this century ends, old-age pension systems worldwide
are experiencing tremendous strain and undergoing rigorous
examination. At issue is the ability of current schemes to survive
demographic changes which threaten to bankrupt most OECD
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(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
members' old age pension systems by the early part of the twentyfirst century (Peterson, 1996; Steuerle & Bakija, 1994; World Bank,
1994). By the year 2040, the proportion of the population over age
65 in most OECD countries is expected to reach 22.2%, up from
9.7% in 1960 (Gilbert, 1998). Moreover, the "support ratio" (number of worker's contributing to old-age pension funds relative
to the number of beneficiaries receiving payments) has declined
dramatically. In the United States, for example, the support ratio
has changed from 16:1 in 1950 to 3.3:1 in 1995 (Bosworth, 1997).
While it is not necessary to have sixteen workers supporting each
retiree, the prediction that the ratio may fall to below 2.0 to I by the
year 2030 is daunting (Peterson, 1996; SSA, 1995; Shipman, 1995).
One of the most important questions raised by the fiscal strains
on public pensions concerns the extent to which it is necessary
to intervene in the traditional pay-as-you go public schemes and
alter the balance between public and private efforts.
A variety of proposals have been advanced in response to
this issue, which reflect different underlying values and priorities.
Varying significantly in their recommendations for the appropriate balance between public and private efforts, these proposals
form a continuum of policy choices ranging from the ameliorative
model (first advocated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to the fully privatized model (recommended by the Cato Institute). Between these two extremes, the
World Bank and others recommend diversification of the publiconly format by relying more heavily on other retirement-income
sources.
THE AMELIORATIVE APPROACH
The first proposal for reform is largely ameliorative in nature, with a driving philosophy that centers on reinforcing the
status quo. From the ameliorative perspective, Social Security is
not in significant fiscal jeopardy, and maintenance of the current system through moderate alterations in either indexing or
benefit levels is sufficient to sustain the program. One of the
first proposals for ameliorative reform was outlined in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (1988)
Reforming Public Pensions. A forerunner in the burgeoning debate
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on old-age pensions, the OECD offered three main strategies
to relieve the financial problems plaguing the pension schemes
in many countries-decrease benefit levels, reduce eligibility, or
increase collected revenues. In proposing these general strategies
the OECD report sought to avoid confronting issues arising from
the unique institutional and political factors that influence specific
reform options in any given country.
More recently, several other international agencies including
the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International
Social Security Association (ISSA), have supported the OECD approach of recommending incremental rather than radical reform.
While neither organization has produced a publication similar to
Reforming Public Pensions, the ISSA has been an active participant
in re-framing the debate concerning social insurance to encompass broader issues of societal well-being, and the nature of social
obligation and social protection. From the ISSA's perspective, the
discourse on Social Security reform has tended to focus on the
macro-economic issues of cost, national savings, and competitiveness to the exclusion of social considerations such as solidarity. A
current project-the "Stockholm Initiative"-focuses on presenting a balanced range of reform options based on analyses that
go beyond a purely economic discussion which concludes that
structural change is necessary.
In the U.S. an ameliorative approach to reform was advanced
by the majority of the US Advisory Council in the "Maintenance of
Benefits" (MB) plan, recommended in the Council's 1997 report.
While the US Advisory Council recommendations resemble those
developed by other agencies and organizations, some specific
features of Advisory Council and its proposals are noteworthy.
First, unlike the OECD, ISSA and ILO, which are voluntary international organization, the US Advisory Council is closely linked
with the Administrative Branch of the Federal government-and
can be viewed as a limited purpose government body. Second, its
analyses are specific to one country and based on reliable data projections generated by the Social Security Administration (SSA).
Finally, the Council convenes at regularly scheduled intervals to
assess the solvency of the U.S. Social Security system and make
recommendations, rather than to develop broader independent
contributions to the discussion as innovative ideas arise.
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The 1994-1996 Advisory Council spent two-years examining
long-term financing, and identifying major areas of concern (U.S.
Advisory Council, 1997). The ambitious aim of the Council's 1997
report was to rectify four problems dealing with (1) the long term
balance, (2) the 75-Year Balance, (3) issues related to contribution
and benefit ratios and (4) low public confidence. While collectively acknowledging these problem areas, and agreeing on other
substantive issues, in 1997 the Council could not arrive at a single,
unified set of recommendations. Instead, three separate proposals were included in the final version of the Council's report,
representing the varied perspectives of its members, and of the
debate itself. The Council's report reflects two of the three paths
toward Social Security reform-the ameliorative and the mixed
approach. While the 1996 Advisory Council's recommendations
were formally announced in 1997, the strategies developed in this
report continue to frame the debate in 1999. For example, recent
proposals by Senator Moynihan and others draw heavily on ideas
advanced by the Advisory Council.
The Advisory Council's majority Maintenance of Benefits proposal is largely ameliorative in nature and features a series of minimalist reforms which the Council insists will eliminate the shortfall in 2010 and improve the long-term actuarial balance of Social
Security. The plan recommends an increase in income taxes on Social Security benefits, and the redirection of funds earmarked for
the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund to OASDI. Other strategies
involve inclusion of new State and local employees currently not
covered by Social Security, and a 1.6 percent combined employeremployee payroll tax increase in 2045. Lastly, the plan advocates
"serious consideration" of Government investment of a portion of
trust fund assets in the equities market-however this important
recommendation was not elaborated upon in any detail.
Ameliorative designs for reform encompass various types of
minor modifications to the existing Social Security system. Most
proposals advance an agenda of conservative adjustments, which
claim to reduce or eliminate the long-term shortfall, without
altering the basic nature of the system. Indeed, the ameliorative
approach by definition seeks to maintain the status quo, and offers
little in the way of innovation. Thus, analysis of the impact of
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ameliorative reform would strongly parallel an assessment of the
current pay-as-you-go funded system of Social Security.
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX APPROACH
A second strategy for reform centers on the transformation of
retirement income away from a dominant publically funded oldage pension, toward a system which incorporates both private
employment pensions and personal savings.
The World Bank is among the strongest proponents of this
type of diversification. There are five separate agencies which are
collectively referred to as the "World Bank Group". Two of these
five organizations comprise the "World Bank"-the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (founded in
1946) and the International Development Association (founded
in 1960) (World Bank, 1996). The Bank is a quasi-political conglomerate, whose goal is to reduce poverty and improve living
standards by promoting sustainable growth and investments in
people (World Bank Group, 1995). The World Bank is a significant
participant in international social policy debates, and utilizes its
funding sources, drawn from subscriptions, income from loans,
and government funds, to advance views about a variety of issues.
The World Bank's influential but controversial study, Averting
the Old Age Crisis (1994) presents the a model for world-wide
reform of old-age pension systems which claims that both old-age
security and financial growth would be improved if governments
develop three "pillars" of old-age security. As illustrated in figure
1, this model includes: 1) a publicly managed system with mandatory participation; 2) a privately managed, mandatory savings
system; and 3) a reasonable level of voluntary savings (World
Bank, 1994). The World Bank views each pillar as necessary for
advancing three separate social aims-redistribution within cohorts, guaranteed insurance, and national savings. The explicit
assumption is that one dominant pillar is incapable of meeting
the needs of a population, and that it is dangerous to rely solely
on a single pillar. However, some scholars take exception to this
approach, suggesting that the Three Pillars model both overstates
the inefficiency of public schemes and under-represents the high
rate of risk inherent in moving toward a partially privatized
system (Beattie and McGillivray, 1995).
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Figure 1

The Three-PillarReformed Old-Age Income Security System
Mandatorypublicly
Characteristic
Objectives

managed pillar
Redistributive plus
coinsurance

Form

Mandatoryprivately
managed pillar
Savings Plus
coinsurance

Voluntary pillar
Savings plus
coinsurance

Flat, or means-tested, Personal savings plan

Personal savings plan

or occupational plan

or occupational plan

or minimum
pension guarantee
Financing

Tax-financed

Regulated, fully funded Fully funded

Source: World Bank (1994), as cited in James E. (1996) Social Security around the world. In P. A.
Diamond, D. C. Lindeman & H. Young (Eds.). Social Security-What Role far the Future. Washington

D.C.: National Academy of Social Insurance.

The World Bank perspective is international, and there are
few country-specific recommendations. Instead, the Bank has
identified three different paradigms based on existing conditions,
a classification which guides later policy discussion. The United
States falls within the "Older Economy with Large Public Pillars"
typology. This group, composed of other OECD and Eastern European countries, shares certain commonalities that are relevant
to the future course of action. The countries possess a rapidly
aging population and substantial public pension programs with
widespread or universal coverage, upon which the population is
dependent. While the degree of urgency varies among nations,
most countries confront the imminent insolvency of their public
pension systems within the next three decades. Although there
are numerous policy options to be decided upon within each
pillar, the Bank does not advocate a single model of pension
reform. Instead, the World Bank approach anticipates that the
design of old-age pension systems will vary depending on the
social values which the government seeks to reinforce. The Bank
provides a framework for governmental reform by posing a series
of questions-the design and outcome of any system is in part
dependent on the answers to these questions. These questions
concern 1) the advisability of a mandatory public pillar 2) the
preferences for redistribution of income 3) the allocation of risk
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4) the merits of a pay-as-you go system and 5) the merits of public
management (James, 1996; World Bank, 1994).
A variety of other organizations have produced mixedapproach proposals. The Committee for Economic Development's (CED) plan Fixing Social Security advocates a combination
of restructuring the beneficiary criteria-for example, reduction
of benefits for a non-working spouse, raising normal retirement
age to 70, and slowed benefit growth for upper and middle income
workers retiring after the year 2000 (which creates a de facto twotier system)-and the creation of a new retirement program of
Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) funded by an additional
1.5 payroll for employers and employees (CED, 1997).
In a similar vein, the two other U.S. Advisory Council recommendations present a mixed approach to reform, which rely
more heavily on private investment and private savings. The less
radical of the Council's two mixed-approach designs is called the
"Individual Accounts" (IA) plan, which creates a dual systemindividual accounts alongside the Social Security System. The
plan calls for the generation of funds through higher income tax
on pension benefits, increased State and local participation, reduction in the growth of benefits, and the acceleration of a scheduled
increase in the age of eligibility. Savings produced from these
measures, combined with a mandatory employee contribution
tax increase of 1.6% would fund individual defined contribution accounts. The individual accounts would be held by the
Government, but some investment choices would be available
to individuals.
A third scheme advanced by the US Advisory group Council
labeled the "Personal Security Account" (PSA) Plan, is the most
radical of the Council's proposals, and advocates large, fullyfunded individual accounts which would replace a portion of
Social Security. The plan involves the redistribution of current
payroll tax contributions: 5 percent allocated to a PSA, which
would be privately managed and invested in a variety of ways,
and the balance dedicated to a modified retirement, disability, and
survivors benefit. All vested workers would collect a flat benefit,
plus whatever proceeds from their PSA. Like the other two approaches, this plan increases State and local coverage, accelerates
the already scheduled age eligibility requirement from 65 to 67,
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increases the early retirement age from 62 to 65, and suggests
a reduction in the level of future benefits for disabled workers
and women who never worked outside the home. However, the
proposal also calls for an increase in benefits for some elderly
widows.
The Personal Security Accounts (PSA) plan is remarkably
complicated, biased toward high-income earners, and risky to
the extent that market forecasts may not materialize. Also, since
the plan relies upon the financial savvy of individual investors,
the very people who most require security in their old age may
be least likely to effectively manage the investments that would
result in a comfortable retirement. While the PSA's guaranteed
flat benefit, (which amounts to $410 in 1996 dollars) provides
some degree of security, this is much less than the average Social
Security benefit in 1999.
Compared to the Personal Security Accounts, the Individual
Accounts (IA) plan navigates a more balanced course between
maintaining the level of security currently provided by Social
Security, while simultaneously increasing revenues and benefits.
Although the IA requires the sharpest and most significant increase in employee payroll contribution at 1.6%, the plan proposes
using the tax system to partially neutralize some of the increase
by providing advantageous tax deferment classification.
THE PRIVATIZED APPROACH
Finally, privatization of old-age insurance has been advanced
as a mechanism for curing the problems confronting the Social
Security system. The Cato Institute is among the most active
proponents for privatizing Social Security. Cato is a Washingtonbased think-tank of self-described "market liberals" who value
"traditional American principles of limited government, individual liberty, and peace" (Cato's Home Page). Their "Social Security
Privatization" project, which began in 1995, is premised on the
belief that Social Security in its current form is unsustainable, and
that the crisis demands immediate attention (Weinberger, 1996).
Cato advocates a fully privatized social security model, similar to that introduced in Chile in 1981. Through a series of working
papers penned by different authors, the Cato project characterizes
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the current system as a Ponzi scheme (Borden, 1995), recommends
broad parameters which should guide the debate (Feldstein, 1997;
Weinberger, 1996), exposes public doubt concerning the viability
of Social Security (Tanner, 1996a), and issues warnings concerning
the danger of allowing government investment of funds (Ostaszewski, 1997). However, the Project has been less forthcoming
about the specifics of a privatized model, other than its admiration
of the Chilean system (Shipman, 1995).
The most detailed description of the Cato vision is found in
Tanner's (1996b) "Privatizing Social Security: A Big Boost for
the Poor", which advocates adoption of a mandatory savings
program, that would redirect the 10.52 percent payroll tax from
OASI to a "Personal Security Accounts" (PSA). Similar to the
Chilean defined-contributions model, the PSAs would be fully
portable, and managed by the private investment industry. The
government would establish regulations regarding portfolio risk
to prevent excessive speculation, and provide a guaranteed minimum benefit if necessary (italics added). The retiree would possess a property right to his or her benefit, rendering remaining
funds bequeathable upon death (Tanner, 1996a). However, the
issue of government regulation is significant, and merits more
attention than the Cato project allows. On financial side, the
Chilean government continues to play a prominent role in the
pension system. A number of the AFPs have failed, been liquidated, or consolidated, and government fiduciary obligations
have escalated well beyond estimations. From an administrative
perspective, the autonomous government agency, the SAFP (Superintendent of Pension Fund Management Companies), has had
limited success at maintaining regulatory standards. Overall, the
Chilean government has been more successful in simply bailing
out the system rather than monitoring it (Borzutzky, 1997).
Another window to its plan is a description found in a Cato
public opinion survey concerning privatization (Tanner, 1996b).
According to Tanner, the program would still require joint contribution from employer and employee. However, instead of FICA
payments going to the SSA, the individual would be allowed to
invest the money in a personal retirement account like an IRA
or 401(k), and would decide how to invest the money in this
account, with any money left in the account being inheritable. The
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participation in the privatized program would not be mandatory,
and those who chose privatization would receive some benefits
under the old system in recognition of what they have already
paid into the current system.
This summary is consistent with other Cato position papers,
and clarifies the issue of an employer's obligation in payroll
contribution, which had previously not been addressed. However
the specific mechanism for the transition from one system to
another, and the compensation for those who stay in the existing
system remain ill-defined. In the end, Cato's contribution may be
less the articulation of a plan, and more the recommendation of a
possible direction for the future of Social Security reform, similar
to the Chilean model.
In 1981 Chile abandoned its national pension system and
adopted a privatized savings plan which makes individuals responsible for their own retirement. The catalyst for reform involved both ideology and fiscal necessity (Passell, 1997). The
primary architect of the Chilean model (and Co-chair of the Cato
Project) is Jos6 Piftera, who was educated at the University of
Chicago, under the tutelage of Milton Friedman. Piftera advocated exchanging Chile's pay-as-you-go national system for that
of privately funded individual accounts in response to both the
market ideology of the Chicago School and frustration with high
payroll taxes-in excess of twenty-five percent, and a patchwork
of underperforming industry-based pension plans.
The Chilean privatization scheme is compulso,- for all new
workers, and optional for existing retirees. The employee contribution rate is set at 10 percent of wages, plus an additional
3 percent to cover costs of disability and survivor's benefits,
for a total rate of 13 percent. The tax is paid exclusively by
the employee-there is no employer contribution. Pension funds
must be invested with one of the twenty-plus publicly regulated (but privately managed) mutual fund groups known as
Administradora de Fondos Pensiones, or AFPs. The AFPs are
directed by the government to take limited investment risks, and
must maintain a fixed percent of their assets in Governmentinsured debt, interest-bearing bank deposits, and Chilean equities
(Kritzer, 1997; Passell, 1997; Petersen, 1996; Pifiera, 1996). The
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accounts are fully portable, and retirees can access their funds
upon retirement at age 65 for men and 60 for women. However, workers may start collecting money from their accounts
at an earlier age, provided sufficient savings exist. Retirees may
continue working while collecting funds, and there no earnings
reduction in their benefit. The Chilean government provides a
means-tested minimum benefit paid out of general revenues, but
is only available when a low-income worker has "spent down"
the worker's personal pension fund. Also, as Borzutzky (1997)
notes the privatized system tends to perpetuate both social and
economic inequities.
Initially, the experience in Chile appears relatively favorable.
In the short-term, high interest rates and phenomenal gains on
Chilean stocks have resulted in an average real return on investments in excess of 14 percent. Replacement rates are equally
impressive, 78 percent of pre-retirement earnings, and over 84
percent if lump sum withdrawals are included in the calculation
(Petersen, 1996). However, a six percent real rate of return is
needed over the long term to maintain a target replacement rate of
70 percent (Kritzer, 1996). The long-term performance, of course,
remains uncertain-the pension funds have not performed as
well recently, dropping to zero growth in 1995 (Passell, 1997),
increasing slightly to 3.5% in 1996 and 4.7% in 1997, then decreasing to -2.5% in 1998 (Chilean Superintendent of Pension Fund
Management Companies, 1998).
Additionally, the Chilean privatization participation rates are
surprisingly low. Although there are over 5 million individuals
enrolled in the new system, only about 58% of all enrollees (or
affiliates) actively contribute to their individual accounts (Kritzer,
1996). While there are various reasons for non-compliance, low
participation among women (26 percent) and the self-employed
(37 percent) accounts for a substantial amount of the delinquency
(Marcel & Arenas, 1992). Moreover, administration fees, quite
high at 4 percent, erode the real rate of return as do additional fees
incurred by persons seeking financial advise on which options
to choose (Kritzer, 1996; Vittas, 1995). Finally, the claims that a
privatized system would increase national savings have failed to
materialize (Mesa-Lago, 1994).
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Other than the Cato position, few openly advocate exchanging the mandatory public system of Social Security for a privatized model. Baker (1996) observes the insurance and investment
industries stand to be big winners in the event of this sort of transformation and may secretly support such a change. Although
the World Bank claims to advance a public-private mix, there is
some evidence that the Bank is a supporter of a privatized model
(James, 1992; Vittas & James, 1994; Vittas, 1993; Vittas, 1995). While
the articles do not openly endorse a private approach, the amount
of attention devoted to private pensions raises some speculation
as to how much of a public role is seen as ultimately desirable in
the Three Pillars perspective.
THREE MODELS OF REFORM: A
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
These three alternatives to pension reform-the ameliorative,
mixed and privatized models-have economic and social implications. From an economic perspective, classical theory suggests
that human behavior is motivated by the desire to maximize
utility and minimize the effects of opportunity cost. According
to this view, the well-being of everyone is best served when
each individual acts in a self-interested fashion (O'Boyle, 1994).
Evaluations of social welfare policies from an economic perspective seek to provide a clear measure of cost and benefit, which
lead to reforms that reflect an emphasis on cost-effectiveness. In
contrast, sociology seeks to explain human behavior in terms of
social norms, values, and processes of socialization (Lutz, 1990).
The sociological approach to policy analysis tends to emphasize
the importance social norms and values prescribed by the community, (i.e. work, self-reliance, social solidarity) more than their
fiscal implications. Evaluations of social welfare policy from this
perspective focus on how potential reforms might impact factors
such as self-reliance and equality.
The emerging field of socio-economic theory merges dimensions of economics and other social sciences to create a broader
perspective that accounts for both cost-benefit analysis and humanistic considerations. The Socio-economic perspective relies
on a deontological model which tempers the utilitarian-based
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paradigm of classical liberalism with moral elements critical to the
formation of personality and society (Etzioni, 1988). By introducing the values of "moral consideration" (humility, cooperation)
and "social bonds" (membership, structure) into the classical
economic model, the socio-economic approach supports policy
reforms which take account of both the traditional measures of
cost and the value of community. This framework draws the
analysts' attention to a broad range of policy issues and values.
Applying this approach, six socio-economic criteria have been
identified to conduct a systematic comparison and assessment of
the ameliorative, mixed and privatized paths to Social Security
reform. The following does not exhaust the range of evaluative
criteria but includes those that are among the most important.
1. Equality-Equality (or "vertical equity") refers to the degree
of redistribution from the wealthier members of one cohort to
the less wealthy of the same cohort.
2. Adequacy-The criteria of adequacy is concerned with the
overall economic adequacy or size of the benefit distributed
to retirees.
3. Solidarity-Examines the extent to which the proposed reform
reinforces the notion of social security as a system of collective
responsibility.
4. Individual Equity-Individual equity concerns the relationship between an individual's contribution during his working
lifetime compared to the pension benefit received, with special
attention to whether an individual's return is "actuarially fair"
(Steurele &Bakija, 1994).
5. Administrative Efficiency-Administrative efficiency addresses the cost-effectiveness of a pension systems' administrative
structure.
6. Personal Responsibility-The criterion of personal responsibility concerns the influence of governmental policy on individual behavior related to the timing of retirement and personal savings.
The extent to which the ameliorative, the public-private mix,
and the privatization proposals rank high, moderate or low relative to each other on these criteria is summarized in Figure 2,
discussed below.
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Figure 2
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Three Paths to Social Security Reform
Ameliorative

Mixed

Privatized

Social Criteria
Equality
Adequacy
Solidarity

high
high
high

moderate
moderate
moderate

low
moderate
low

Economic Criteria
Individual Equity
Administrative Efficiency
Personal Responsibility

low
high
low

moderate
moderate
high

moderate
low
moderate

Equality
The ameliorative approach to reform supports the conventional model of Social Security, which is premised upon the distributional principle of progressivity of benefits within a given
cohort. Although, the universal nature of old-age pension benefits
precludes directly targeting benefits only to those most in need,
the system of progressive replacement rates acts as a proxy for
targeting by ensuring a higher rate of return to lower-income
earners. In addition, an indirect method of targeting may be employed through ameliorative reforms that recommend increasing
taxation on pension benefits for those in the upper income brackets. In the U.S. for example, the replacement rate benefit formula
provides a higher rate of return on contributions of low-wage
earners than for those with higher wages. Although benefits are
thus generally considered progressive, contributions collected via
payroll taxes are regressive in nature since lower income earners
are taxed at the same rate as higher income earners.
In the mixed approach to reform, that proportion of benefits
derived from the public side of the scheme continue to be based
on a progressive benefits formula.
By contrast, reforms favoring a privatized model are least
likely to result in redistribution toward the poor. Most plans rely
on the admittedly regressive nature of the payroll tax for the
collection of revenues, without providing a progressive payment

Three Paths to Social Security Reform

141

scheme. However, maintenance of a means-tested minimum benefit drawn from general revenues could ensure a modicum of
redistribution, if not vertical equity
Adequacy

On the issue of adequacy, ameliorative reforms tend to favor small reductions in benefits which lower their replacement
rate-a trend that is already underway (Steuerle & Bakija, 1994).
Average replacement rates vary among OECD member countries
ranging from a high of 80 percent in Italy to a low of 40 percent
in Canada (Bovenberg & van der Linden, 1997). While policymakers have attempted to ensure the stability of replacement
rates by indexing benefits with cost-of-living-adjustments, in the
U.S. replacement rates for higher than average wage earners are
already lower than a decade ago. [However replacement rates for
low and average wage earners are higher than the historical norm
(Steuerle & Bakija, 1994).]
Proposals for the mixed model are likely to produce a moderate to high degree of replacement depending on their extent of
reliance on the market. Mixed proposals vary greatly in how to
structure the movement away from a publically funded pension
system. In the United States, the Advisory Council recommended
two separate models-one which creates a dual system of accounts with IAs (Individual Accounts) alongside the existing
Social Security system, the other which advocates fully funded
individual accounts PSAs (Personal Security Accounts) which
would replace a portion of Social Security. Although replacement
rates in these schemes would vary with the equities market, the
major portion would still be tied to the Social Security benefit.
Proponents of the privatization model suggest that greater
reliance on the private market will increase the adequacy of the
benefit, creating a positive situation for low and high income
earners alike (Tanner, 1996b). However, the ability of a privatized
system to generate adequate pension benefits is entirely dependent upon market performance, which in recent years has been
strong in the U.S. but not in many other OECD countries, and
is uncertain over longer periods of time. Thus, privatization of
public pension systems is a risky proposition, unable to ensure
the level of future returns.
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Solidarity
T. H. Marshall (1964) suggests that the social rights of citizenship form a societal glue that binds together people from diverse
backgrounds, and unites them in a common national community.
More recently, Etzioni (1988) has discussed the importance of
linking values of "social bonds" (membership, structure, etc.)
to policy reforms which support both the traditional measures
of cost and the importance of community Some analysts suggest that public pay-as-you-go pension programs may serve this
function-by promoting a sense of solidarity among and between
generations (Euz~by, 1997). While this argument may resonate
more strongly in European countries than in the United States,
surveys consistently reveal that Americans express strong support for the Social Security program, even as confidence levels
have decreased and uncertainty concerning the availability of
future benefits has increased (Reno & Friedland, 1997). Support
may be in part attributable to the realization that the Social Security system reduces the obligation and necessity for members
of the working generation to directly contribute to the support of
their elderly parents. Whether the sentiment of reduced freedom
from obligation toward one's parents amounts to social solidarity in the socio-economic sense is questionable. However, from
this perspective, ameliorate reform will reinforce the bonds of
solidarity, by continuing the traditions of contribution and an
intergenerational contract.
It seems unlikely that a mixed system will result in increased
social solidarity, unless 1) a mixed system produces substantial
gains for everyone and 2) the assumptions which underlie classical economics hold true-that the well-being of everyone is
best served when each individual is motivated by self-interest.
Instead, class cleavages may further erode solidarity since the
middle and upper class may benefit most from mixed reform
proposals. Moreover, to the degree that mixed plans call for an
increased role for private employment pensions, greater reliance
on this funding stream may prove divisive absent policies to
provide all echelons of workers with similar accounts.
The move toward privatization is unlikely to engender solidarity among citizens, unless the experiment were so successful
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as to create a sense of comradery for the collective good fortune
of the participants. However, to the extent that such a sentiment
arises, it would more likely be based on individual self-interest
rather than the type of collective social solidarity discussed by
Etzioni and others.
Individual Equity
Nearly all industrialized nations finance their public pension
system based on a pay-as-you-go model in which the current
population of workers pay for the retirement costs of current
retirees. This arrangement is predicated on an intergenerational
contract that promises similar treatment for each successive cohort of retirees, based upon their past contribution (Bosworth,
1997). However, demographic trends (declining support ratios,
climbing life expectancies and an increase in the average length
of retirement) and economic changes (a real increase in size of
benefits for current retirees, lower interest rates) have affected the
rate of return compared to the present value of past contributions.
Described as a Ponzi-scheme, pay-as-you-go systems tend to generate higher rates of return for early participants with a gradual
depreciation for younger cohorts. In their study of the United
States's Social Security system, Chen and Goss (1997) found that
individuals who retired from 1960 to 1968 received a 12.5 percent
real rate or return on their contribution, whereas workers retiring
between 1982 and 1987 received a much lower 5.9 percent return,
with future retirees experiencing an even lower real rate of return.
Thus, ameliorative reform will perpetuate the increasingly larger
disparity between the returns experienced by current and past
generations of retirees versus current workers and future retirees.
As demonstrated by Steurele and Bakija (1994) and others, absent
some sort of structural intervention, the passage of time alone is
eroding individual equity since some members of future retiree
cohorts will experience negative net-transfers.
The transition from a dominant public-pillar model to one
which relies more heavily on mixed or alternative retirement
sources may present some problems of individual equity. However, a relatively gradual transformation will lessen the burden
that any generation must shoulder, and ultimately the move away
from exclusive reliance on a pay-as-you-go system will promote
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greater individual equity. What differentiates the mixed approach
from the fully privatized approach is that by diversifying retirement income sources, no one source is as important. Given the
unpredictability of the future economy, a diversified portfolio of
retirement income seems the most prudent course for a fair rate
of return.
A fully privatized scheme is likely to produce winners and
losers even in a regulated system. Thus, privatization will be
more inconsistent in providing an equitable return. While in
theory all participants could recoup their contributions and even
make a considerable gain on investments, an alternative scenario could include an entire of cohort of retirees who lose a
significant proportion of their retirement savings in the event
of having to retire during an economic down-turn. At the same
time, privatization offers another definition of individual equity.
That is, when employees are responsible for their own retirement
whatever the market yields can be considered a "fair" return on
their investment.
Administrative Efficiency
The case for ameliorative reform on the criterion of administrative efficiency is positive. Most OECD member nations have
administrative infrastructure that efficiently conduct the major
management functions of large scale public programs at a low
cost. In the U.S. for example, less than one cent of every Social
Security tax dollar collected goes to administration, which makes
U.S. operation among the most cost-effective programs in the
world (Ross, 1997).
The public-private mixed approach would probably be less
efficient than the status quo. The infrastructure necessary to manage accounts is not in place, and the costs may be closer to those
of a fully privatized model than the very low administrative
costs of the current system of Social Security. The administrative
costs of privatization will most likely be higher than the current
1% operating cost of the public system in the U.S., and the ability
of individuals to opt-out of the current compulsory scheme will
raise costs due to economies of scale alone.
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Personal Responsibility
The ameliorative approach to Social Security reform would
do little to modify the behavioral tendencies encouraged by the
current system. This is not a positive development in light of the
trend toward decreased personal savings, and increased propensity toward early retirement (Peterson, 1996; Steurele & Bakija,
1994). The effect of a public pension on private savings behavior
is difficult to quantify empirically (Thompson, 1997). Originally,
Feldstein (1974) posited that Social Security would diminish national savings, since government retirement income might reduce
the amount private individuals would otherwise save. According
to Gramlich (1997), national savings (NS) is a function of the sum
of all private, state and local savings (PS), Social Security savings
(SS), and all other federal savings (FS), all divided by the total
gross domestic product (GDP). While the national savings rate
has declined precipitously since the 1960s, and private savings
has decreased, this is more a function of the change in deficit
spending than disincentives toward savings created by a government retirement benefit (i.e. governmental deficit spending
plays a proportionally larger role in the erosion of national savings
rates than has the decrease in personal savings) (Bosworth, 1997).
Although Peterson (1996) seems confident in his assertion that
public pension policy has led to a decrease in personal savings,
most others are not willing to draw a causal connection despite
the fact that rates of savings have declined.
A clearer case of the effect of pension policy is presented in
the area of retirement timing. Quadango and Quinn (1997) suggest that the Social Security system generates strong incentives
to retire, and people have responded accordingly. Labor force
participation rates among males over the age of 65 have dropped
from 45.8 percent in 1950 to 15.8 percent in 1991. (The rates for
women have not changed as dramatically-in 1950,9.7 percent of
women age 65 or older were employed in the civilian labor force,
versus 8.6 percent in 1991). At the same time, the number of men
surviving to age 65 has risen from 53.9 percent in 1940 to 72.3
percent in 1990 (60.6 percent for women to 83.6 percent) (Steuerle
& Bakija, 1994). (Total life expectancy as well as total number of
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persons surviving to age 64 are predicted to continue to rise well
into the next century for both men and women).
While the incentive to move older workers out of the labor
force made sense at one time, this practice is problematic given the
current demographic realities. Not only are people retiring earlier,
but they are living longer (and collecting more) than previous
generations of retirees. Under ameliorative reform in the U.S. the
normal retirement age (NRA) will climb to 67 by the year 2022
(recent proposals recommend raising it further to age 70). This
incremental increase in NRA is unlikely to significantly prolong
labor force participation in light of strong financial disincentives
to work beyond the NRA. Legislated changes slated to take place
early next century will minimize some of the current disincentives
toward work. However the ameliorative approach does nothing
more to promote work among the elderly.
On the issue of behavioral incentives, the mixed model may
inhibit the incentives toward early departure from the labor market. This is particularly true if the public portion of the retirement benefit is increased in the event of continued labor market
participation, or if the portion of benefits from private accounts
engenders a belief that working longer results in personal rewards. Regarding personal savings, the extent to which the mixed
system would increase savings behavior is unclear. Although the
portion of contribution devoted to private accounts is a form
of individual savings, a question remains as to whether people
would decrease other forms of private savings as their personal
accounts accumulated, with a net result of little or no gain in
private savings.
Finally, proponents of privatized pensions suggest this approach would have a strong positive effect on individual savings through the private retirement accounts. As with the mixed
model, however, the question remains as to whether the advent
of private accounts would diminish other private retirement savings. As for the timing of retirement, there are three ways in which
privatization might impact the period of employment: a) pension
regulations could mandate that people work for a longer period
to be fully vested, or require a particular level of savings prior to
retirement b) as with the private portion of the mixed model, the
relation between increased work effort and the accumulation of a
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private asset that could be passed on to the next generation might
exert an influence for a longer work-life c) also the state of the
market in which the retirement account is invested, particularly
in a period of decline, might provide a stimulus to work longer.
CONCLUSION
None of three of the reform options analyzed in this paper
rank positively on all of the soico-economic criteria. By conducting a socio-economic policy analysis of the three approaches,
this paper draws attention to values embedded in each path
to system reform. Returning to Figure 2, we can see that the
ameliorative model is strongest on the social criteria, but weakest
on a cumulative ranking on the economic criteria. The privatized
model is the reverse-weakest in the area of social criteria and
strongest on the economic side. The mixed model pooling the
advantages and disadvantages of the ameliorative and privatized
approaches, comes out pretty much as expected with a moderate
ranking across the board. Representing the course of moderation,
the mixed model would seem to offer the safest alternative, if
one's objectives are to create a retirement scheme that would not
rank too low on an any of the areas of concern.
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